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The rar>id expansion of the armed services during
World War II caused many nroblems during the post-war years.
One of the roost persistent of these, one produced by the war,
is that of the "hump" in the regular officer structure. This
problem is not confined to the Marine Corps but exists In
varying decrees in all of the military services. The problem
is more serious in the Marine Corps and Navy due primarily to
the large proportion of regular officers within the total
officer structure. While the Navy and Marine Corps "hump"
problems are in general similar, there is enough variance to
require that they be discussed separately. This paper will be
used to develop and discuss the officer "hump problem" as it
is found in the Marine Corps. The problem has been of parti-
cular interest to work on at this time due to the fact that
hearings are currently being held on legislation which if
passed will provide considerable assistance toward solution
to the problem.
Over the past five years, and in particular the last
year, there has been a great deal of discussion of the "hump"
problem. There are very few regular officers in the Marine
Corps who do not have a verbal acquaintance with the problem;
however, there are very few officers who have a detailed
knowledge of the problem and the effects that it will have on
1

2their careers. The "hump" problem and any solution to It will
affect almost all officers in the regular structure in varying
degrees. It is therefore important from a career planning
viewpoint to have as complete a knowledge of the "hump" and
its effects as is possible. This paper will be addressed to
this captive audience and will attempt to provide a meaningful
and informative explanation of the "hump".
The primary effort in the paper will be directed at
the problem as it exists today and the future, rather than on
the historical background of the problem • The paper will con-
centrate on the problem as It exists today and the solution
that is contemplated rather than on th^ cause of the problem
and other possible solutions. It Is hoped that this approach
will provide a better understanding of the problem and a more
meaningful basis for the individual regular officer to plan
for the future.
An effort will be made to provide sufficient background
information on the development of a regular structure to allow
the reader to have a clear picture of the problem and the
solution. The paper approaches the problem on a chronological
basis commencing with the decisions at the end of World War II
which formed the start of the problem. From that point many
factors influenced the size of the problem until It reached
a point where additional legislation was required to solve the
problem equitably. The chronological process will be oontinued
to examine the period out through 1970 so as to provide a
complete picture. An attempt will be made to view the problem
from the viewpoint of the Marine Corps as well as that of the

3individual to try to show the reasoning behind the decisions
that are made.
It is hoped that this paper will give the individual
officer in the Marine Corps a dearer picture of what lies
ahead. Undoubtedly there will be changes in the future that
will cancel out some of the projected information. Much of
the material is suoh that changes will be minor and for that
reason th« information presented should form a reasonable
basis for making future career plans. If this paper does
provide an increased degree of understanding among the regular






The hump is the disproportionate number of
Regular officers of the Navy and Marine Corps who
were originally commissioned during World War II.
These officers are practically all contemporaries
from the standpoint of age, years of service, and
experience and they represent one-third of all the
Regular officers of the Navy and the Marine Corps. 1
This statement describes, in broad terms, what the
hump is, but in order to understand the problems that it
creates it is necessary to have some background knowledge of
the Regular officer structure itself. This chapter will
attempt to ^rovio'e the necessary background information. Such
Items as grade distribution, normal attrition, promotion
attrition, and normal time- in-parade will be discussed in
relation to the development of a regular officer structure.
This chapter will also provide a short historical review of
the formative years of the hump and of the various factors
that have had influence on the problem in the period from World
War II to the present. These two major areas should provide
the reader with an understanding of the nature of the hump and
some insight into the problems that arise from it.
U. ~. Congress, House. Providing Improved Opportunity
for Promotion for Certain Officers in the Naval Service, and
for Other Purposes . House Report No. 71, (Washington: G-overn-
ment Printing Office, 1959), p. 3.

The Regular Officer Structure
The development of a balanced regular officer structure
requires the coordination of the many factors that have an
effect on the regular structure. This theoretical balance is
seldom if ever actually achieved due to changes in planning,
and needs that cannot be foreseen. So the structure Is normally
a compromise between the Ideal and that which can be achieved
in view of the realities of required change.
The building block of the regular structure is the
Annual year group. The term annual year group is defined aB all
the officers commissioned within a period which commences with
the day following the graduation of a Kaval Academy class and
ending with the graduation date of the subsequent class. The
year group is designated by the closing date of the year group
and thus Is roughly similar to the fiscal year. As an example,
the year group that is presently being formed, which will be
complete x^ith the graduation of the Naval Academy class in
June, 1959, will be designated as year group 59. The regular
structure, at any given time, is composed of 30 year groups,
plus a small number of General Officers with more than 30 years
of commissioned service. As a year group proceeds through Its
30 years of service, it suffers losses. These losses are In
the form of normal attrition such as deaths, resignations, and
voluntary retirements; and from promotional attrition which is
levied in accordance with the needs of the service based on
2
U. S. Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Order
1412.6, Zarch 25, 1957.

6legislatively fixed procedures. Thus the size of the original
annual year group decreases with each year of service in
accordance with the changing plane. Figure 1 illustrates an
officer structure composed of equal sized initial year groups.
As can be seen the rear groups decrease, during a 30 year
period of lervloe, from about 560 to about 80. The forced or
promotion? 1 attrition that has been levied for the purposes of
thie figure is about that which would be desirable under an
ideal situation.
The factor of noricai attrition is obviously one that
cannot be planned for on an individual basis in that it results
from decisions that are beyond control of the planner. The
historical data however presents an amazingly consistent picture
and the planner is able to forecast group norsal attrition with
a high degree of accuracy. Whether this will continue to be
true, when the larger hump year groups commence reaching the
area of voluntary retirement! at 20 years of commissioned
service, is a point about which there is much conjecture. The
normal attrition vsries by grade with the grade of major showing
the lowest normal attrition and the grade of colonel having the
highest. The lov rate of normal attrition in the grade of major
is probably due nriiuarlly to lovr resignation rates, in compari-
son with the junior grades, ana: no retirement rate when
compared with the more senior grades. The average normal
attrition for the entire regular officer structure is about
three per cent annually, and this is the figure that is normally
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8Promotional attrition serves as a means of increasing
the average quality of the year group at each promotion point
as it advances in grade. The Officer Personnel Act of 19^7'»
envisioned a promotion attrition of around 20 per cent at each
promotion point. In actual oractice, even in a balanced
structure, the desirable promotion attrition would vary with
the promotion point. A promotion attrition is all that is
considered necessary or desirable at the first lieutenant to
captain promotion point, A 20 per cent attrition would be
utilized at the next two promotion points, and a 25 per cent
attrition would be levied from lieutenant colonel to colonel.
In actual practice the percentage promotional attrition is a
function of the number of vacancies that are anticipated in the
next 5-year period as contrasted with the number of officers
that it is desired or required to place in the promotion zones
during that period of time. It should be noted in passing that
while we speak of this as attrition, it is attrition that may
be greatly delayed. This is true of all field grade officers
that have reached promotion points in a shorter time period
than that contemplated in the Officer Personnel kct. This
point will later be discussed more fully.
Another means of incrementing the officer structure
is to do so by grades. This is the manner in which we are all
more accustomed to seeing the officer structure broken down.
The Officer Personnel Act set forth various points, in terms of
years of commissioned service, at which officers must reach
certain promotion points. It should be stressed that these were

9maximums rather than necessarily ideal points. As envisioned
by this Act an officer would be promoted from second lieutenant
to first lieutenant after three years of commissioned, service;
from first lieutenant to < in after six years of service;
from captain to major after 12 years; from major to lieutenant
colonel after 18 yaarfl of service; and from lieutenant colonel
to colonel after 24 years of commissioned service. The Act
made provision for the separation or retirement of officers who
had twice failed of selection based on the promotion flow that
has just befin outlined. Thus the situation arises that when
promotion flow is ahead of the maximum, time schedule, twice
passed over officers cannot be involuntarily retired until they
reach the requisite number of years of commissioned service.
The Officer Personnel Act also orovided limitations on regular
officer grade distributions. Title I, which was applicable to
an all regular officer structure, provided the following maximum
distribution:
Colonel - 6%




The percentages stated above are applicable to the total regular
officer strength. Title III of the Act also provided the officer
grade distribution for a struouire composed of both regular and
reserve officers. This has been superceded toy the Officer Grade
Limitation Act of 1954, which provides the officer grade
limitations based on the total unrestricted officer strength.





Lieutenant Colonel - 1?R7
Major - 2387
Spaces that are not utilized in the senior grades may be
carried downward to grades Junior, Thus we are legislatively
supplied with some restrictions on the planning of our officer
structure which, as we shall see later, provide a source of
difficulty in devising an equitable means of solving the hump
problem. With this short background in some of the various
factors that have amplication in the planning of an officer
structure, let us examine briefly the developmental period of
the hump and the various events that have influenced its
development.
Prior to World V»"ar II, the regular structure of the
Marine Corps contained about 1000 officers, and was a relatively
balanced structure. At the end of World War II the decision
was reached to expand the regular officer structure from the
pre-war 1000 up to 7000. It was likewise decided to take
advantage, to the maximum degree, of the talent that had been
developed during World War II in building toward the regular
force of 7000 officers that was desired. Thus a large integra-
tion program was opened up to this group and the result was
that year groups 42 through 46 were greatly oversized. Figure
2 Illustrates the regular officer structure as it existed on
1 July, 1947 » after the integration programs had been completed.
As can be seen from the figure, the size of year groups 42
















This If the hump and at that time period contained about 6
of the total regular officer strength. This did not offer a
serious problem front the itandpoint of grade distribution in
that all of this croup was in the lieutenant/captain area ana
could thus be accommodate Bily. It would be very easy,
lookir^ back on thla situation, to ray that the Marina >I
made a mist) I I in integrating the large numbers that they did
into the regular establishment. That ins teed they should have
proceeded at a slower pace to build to the regular structure
that was felt to be necessary. There may have been strong
justification, at the time concerned, for the rapid buildup in
the regular structure. It ie not the purpose of this paper to
try to Justify or condemn the actions of the planners during
this period.
Almost immediately after this integration program was
completed budgetary considerations became a heavy burden to
bear. During the period from 1947 up until the start of the
Korean War, the Marine Corps, as well as the other services,
were being cut back in strength. tia the large regular
structure that had recently been developed, the Marine Corps
was forced to absorb reductions in strength through cut backs
in new procurement. Thus the year groups that were formed
during this period were smaller than was necessary to suooort
the regular structure of the size conterr.slated by the planners.
The series, of year groups that was oroduced during this neriod
is referred to as the valley. These valley year groups of 47
through 50, tended to accentuate the size of the humo. Promotion
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flow was slow during this neriod as the Marine Corps attempted
to compensate for the accelerated promotion flow of the war
years. There was only a small amount of promotional attrition
applied during these years as there were still a large number
of vacancies existing in the higher grades due to the rapid
expansion in the size of the regular structure that had taken
place.
From this period of cut backs and budgetary restrictions,
the Marine Corps came into a period of rapid expansion in the
form of the Korean War. This need for rapid expansion made it
inconsistent to reduce the number of officers through the use
of forced promotion attrition, while at the same time having
to recall World War II reservists to active duty. The Marine
Corps used temporary promotion laws throughout this period,
and thus selected on a qualified basis rather than the best
fitted basis that is applicable under the normal statutory
process. At the conclusion of the Korean War, the Marine Corps
reselected all officers promoted during this period by statutory
boards and levied about o 27- attrition on the group. There
was some further expansion of the regular structure during
this period in the form of new integration programs, but for the
most part the expansion was limited to areas that were junior
to the hump and therefore did not further complicate the
problem. The rapid expansion of our forces did do one thing
that had an effect on the hump, and that wae to once again
^U. S. Congress, House. Hearings before Subcommittee




accelerate promotion flow. This was particularly true in the
more senior areas of the regular establishment , as it now
became necessary to fill the vacancies that already existed as
a result of the previous expansion of the structure. It was
at about this time that procedures were planned that would be
used to solve the hump problems which would start reaching the
action point in about five years. I do not wish to indicate
that there was no consideration of the hump prior to this,
but merely that the action period of any plan concerning the
hump was too far in the future for fruitful planning to be
performed
.
From the end of the Korean Jar the Marine Corps was
again faced with the normal heavy emphasis on lowered costs
and economy in defense. As a part of this picture, there were
general cuts in authorized, personnel strengths in all the
military services. These cutbacks had an effect on grade
distributions and thereby on any solutions to the hump. It
was during this period that the pressure of the hump began to
be felt in the every-day efforts of the planners. Table of
Organization rank structure was rising, partially as a result
of increasingly complex military responsibility, but in my
opinion due more to pressure of the hump requiring larger
numbers of higher rank billets. There were also internal
problems arising as to what category of officer should fill
certain billets. One element that undoubtedly contributed,
and will continue to contribute, to the difficulties that were
arising, was the fact that most of the people that were doing
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the working level planning In these areas were the same people
who were most closely affected by the hump. This human factor
cannot be overlooked in viewing the problems that have arisen.
This chapter provided the reader with a brief look
at some of the factors that influence the planning of a regular
officer structure. A brief look was also taken at the formative
period of the hump and at the events that have had an effect
upon the hump in the intervening time periods up to the present.
Secretary Gates, in his testimony before the House Armed Forces
Subcommittee on H. R. 4413, described the formative period of
the hump in this way:
The requirements of war and the timing of history have
left us with one-third of all our Regular officers
concentrated in a four year span of seniority. These
officers are nearly contemporaries in age, grade and
experience. They joined and fought in : orld War II,
and stayed to man the postwar I^lavy and Marine Corps
when we badly needed experienced and competent young
officers. They filled indispensable commands and
positions during Korea. Our needs during these years
of war and cold war have never permitted us to reduce
their numbers appreciably by selection out.^
4
U. S. Congress, House. Hearings before Subcommittee




THE OFFICER HUMP TODAY
This chapter will attempt to analyze the regular
officer structure that exists in the Marine Corps today, with
particular emphasis on the characteristics of the hump. The
officer structure is really reflective of four periods in
Marine Corps history, and it stands today as a composite profile
of these four periods. Tho year groups senior to the hump are
for the most part representative of the planning prior to
World "war II, and as such are very small in size, The hump
Itself is representative of World War II with its swollen
procurement problems, and thus these year groups are in excess
of any balanced structure requirements. The valley year groups
(47 through 50) compensate in size for the hump, but were not
the result of the hump directly, and can more nearly be con-
sidered the result of the budgetary restrictions which control-
led military decisions during this period. The fourth group
represented in the structure are the most recent year groups
which are reflective of a concentrated effort to provide the
Marine Corps with a balanced regular structure through the use
of equal size annual year groups. Statistical techniques will
be utilized to give a detailed expression to the structure as




which is the outward expression of the many interrelated
problems connected with the hump.
Since the formation of the hump shortly after the
World War II, the entire officer structure has advanced in
grade through the years with very Snail amounts of promotional
attrition being applied. The year groups senior to the hump,
being small in size, were able to advance to grade vacancies
resulting from the expansion of the regular structure with
little, and in some cases no, promotional attrition. The hump
groups had to some decree already benefitted from accelerated
promotion; by the time that these year groups were reaching the
next promotion polr-t. Korea was upon us. It should be noted,
however, that while the Marine Corps promoted during the Korean
War with little attrition, those selected were reselected under
statutory processes after Korea with a 27 percent averap
e
attrition. Figure 3 shows the advancement of the hump during
the period from 19^7 to 1958. As can be seen, while the
numbers of officers in the hump diminished during these years
the basic profile remains pretty much intact*
Figure 4 sets forth in detail the distribution of the
regular officer structure as of 1 July, 1958, together with
a theoretical balanced structure of approximately the same size
for purposes of contrast. As can be seen from the figure, the
structure today la compatible with the theoretical structure
down through the grade of captain. In the grade of major we
find two discrepancies, the first of these being the large
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This is true despite the fact that the leading edge of the
valley, with its undersized year groups has already penetrated
into this grade. Thll then draws attention to the fact that
while the grade of major is composed of six year groups, better
than 90 percent of the majors lie in the four hump year groups
that are in that grade. Additionally these senior year groups
in the grade of major are still on accelerated promotion flow.
That is they will he in the promotion zone for lieutenant
colonel ahead of the Officer Personnel Act ideal. This situa-
tion will reetifj itself shortly, in that the large number of
officers in year group 43 cannot be absorbed in one or two
promotion zones, end the remaining year groups will be on
promotion flovr.
In viewing the lieutenant colonel area on Figure 4,
we can see the primary impact of the hump. All of the lieuten-
ant colonels in the Marine Corps today fall in about two year
groups Instead of the normal seven. This area will compress
even a little more during the next year or two. This means
that the grade of eolonel contains thirteen year groups as
opposed to six under the ideal situation. This distribution
of year groups in the grade of colonel, is the result of a
requirement for colonels which could not be filled by the
normal number of undersized year groups ahead of the hump,
and therefore required accelerated promotion. The colonels
senior to year group 37 have all been passed over for brigadier
general, but due to the accelerated promotion vacancies will
not be created for a number of years based on current legislation
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and policy. Thus Figure 4 has rhown that, the valley year
groups are relatively oloee to normal OFA promotion flow; the
hump year prouns are slightly accelerated at present hut will
very shortly br on normal flow to lieutenant colonel; the year
groups senior to the hump are accelerated and will continue to
be accelerated for the next several years.
Figure 5 offers a slightly different view of the
regular structure. This is an analysis of the structure by
age. The hump is clearly evident in this distribution. From
the situation as it exists today we can draw several conclu-
sions. The average ape of lieutenant colonels will decrease
for the next few years while the average age of the majors and
lieutenant colonels will be increasing. This means that there
will be further compression of ape characteristics viewing
the field prade area as a whole.
As was previously mentioned, the regular officer
structure has been able to proceed without a great deal of
promotional attrition betnp necessary or desirable due to the
expansion of the Marine Cor]">s and the Korean War. The time
has been reached, however, when the lack of adequate promotional
attrition in the past har created severe promotional problems.
The primary and immediate problem is concerned, with the
promotion outlook for majors due for promotion to lieutenant
colonel. This problem can be stated very simply: "Under
current legislation, the Officer Personnel Act, only 435
vacancies for about 1940 majors will occur over the next 5-year
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gperiod, - The small number of vacancies that will occur is
the result of the lack, of oromotional attrition and the
accelerated promotion flow in the areas senior to the hump.
Nov | why are the vacancies during, the next 5 years
limited to 435? Simply because the current 1
creates vacancies by forced retirement after two
failures of selection at the 30-year point for
colonels, and at the 26-year point for lieutenant
colonels. Except for voluntary retirement and normal
attrition, this is the only way vacancies can occur."
The vacancies that are exnected to occur during the next 5-year
period Include 70 colonels who have been twice Dassed over for
selection to brigadier general, and who will reach 30 years of
service. The remainder of the vacancies, except for 17 twice
passed over lieutenant colonels reaching. 26 years service, will
result from normal attrition. The 1940 majors who should be
placed in promotion zones in the next 5-year oeriod under the
current legislation, are those remaining in the hump in the
p-rade of major. All of these officers will reach 18 years of
commissioned service during this period. It should be clearly
understood that this is only the first nromotion problem that
will occur in connection with the hump. It is almost inevitable
that a similar type of problem will be present in oassing the
hump year groups through the next nromotion barrier from
lieutenant colonel to colonel.
In looking for a solution to the nromotlon problem that
5
U. 3. Congress, House. Hearings before Subcommittee
No. 1, Committee on firmed Service s 00 H. R. 443/? ('/.qshington:




\has just been described there are two underlying principles
which must he applied*
(a) The needs of the Marine Corps with regard to
quantity, quality, and stamina of the officer Corps.
(h) The need? of the Individual officers with regard
to equity of treatment and an adequate career with
appropriate- incentives.?
The three control variables that can be used in reaching a
solution to the basic problem are:
1. Increased promotional attrition
2. Expansion of the grade distribution
3. Retardation of promotion flow
Each of these variables by themselves fails to meet
either one or the other of the two principles that we have set
forth abov°, In the case of increased promotional attrition,
the needs of the Marine Corps would be met for the present but
it might create additional problems in later years, through
the early force out of young officers who would later be
required. In addition it is obviously not equitable to levy
the amount of promotional attrition that would be required on
one segment of the regular establishment. The expansion of
grade distribution in order to absorb the hump in higher grades
does nothing but postpone the current nrouiotion problem into
the following promotion point of major to lieutenant colonel.
To even if Congress could be oersuaded to increase the grade
distribution, it would not meet the needs of the Marine Corps
over the long term. The other variable in the promotion picture,
7U. S. Congress, House. Hearings before Subcommittee
flgj 1. Committee on Armed Services on ii, *R. 4?Tl3 (Washington
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retardation of promotion flow, by itself meets neither of our
basic principles. Retardation of promotion flow would as^e
the officer corps to an extent that it would have an effect
on the physical stamina required for the operation of the
Marine Corps* Thus none of the variables in themselres offer
a means of solution of the hump problem. It la In a composite
or combination Of these variables that the solution to the
problem must be found.
In this chapter the regular structure has been
examined with particular emphasis on the hump Itself , and on
the promotion problem connected with it. The various control
variables which can be utilized in arriving at a solution to
the problem were briefly discussed. The two basic principles
by which any solution to the hump must be judged were stated,
and were applied to the three control variables. So now we
arrive at the point of finding a solution or at least partial




In this chapter we will review the planning that took
place within the Marine Corps and Navy in arriving at their
joint request for legislative assistance in solving their
respective hump problems. We will also analyze the legislation
itself as to its major provisions, together with the controversy
in the hearings with regards to certain of the provisions. As
at this time the legislation has not been acted on by the
Senate, the legislation as approved by the House is all that
will be discussed. Some effort will be made, however, to fore-
cast the changes that will be recommended in the Senate* and
the general form of the final bill that will be approved. It
was hoped that by the time that this portion of the paper was
prepared that the Senate would have found the opportunity to
act upon the bill, due to the fact that it is in the Senate
that the bill Is more aot to find resistance.
Planning a solution to the officer hump problem has
been going on nearly from the spotlighting of the problem in
the post-war years. The Korean War modified much of the planning
that had been done by the acceleration of promotions and the
lack of promotional attrition during that period. So for the




that which commenced after the end of the Korean War. It is
safe to say that despite the adverse effects on officer hump
planning caused by the reduction in promotional attrition and
accelerated promotion flow, the Korean //ar aided in the hump
solution. The increase in the planned size of the Marine Corps
for the post-Korean oeriod provided the planners with a little
more flexibility in the matter of grade distributions; this
provided them one more variable for use in solving the problem.
In planning the officer structure of the Marine Corps,
the primary forecast period is five years. This five year
projection is made annually, with revisions to the current year
and budget year being made almost monthly. The regular
structure, within the overall officer structure, is projected
out for a period of ten to twenty years. It is in this projec-
tion that the hump planning is carried on on a continuing basis.
It was apparent in the planning that no serious problem would
arise in connection with the hump until 1959$ and it appeared
at that time that legislation would be required to solve the
hump problem adequately. It is apparent that in order to
project the regular structure for a period of ten to twenty
years it would be necessary to make assumptions concerning the
three variables. An examination of the structure as it would
exist by fixinr each of these variables in turn, will show in
general how the assumptions used were arrived at. In Figure 6
the promotion attrition has been fixed at desirable rates of
20# from major to lieutenant colonel, and 30% from lieutenant







a desirable level and at a maximum reaches the Officer
Personnel Act maximums. With these two variables fixed the
grade distribution was allowed to vary as necessary to absorb
the hump as it moves through the 1960-1970 period. As can be
seen from Figure 6, the authorized grade limitations would be
exceeded in the grade of lieutenant colonel for the years I960
through 1965. In the grade of colonel, grade distribution
authorized under the Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954 is
exceeded in I960, increases steadily through 1969 and then
commences a gradual decline. In 1969 the number of colonels
would exceed the number of lieutenant colonels, an obviously
undesirable situation.
Figure 7 approaches the problem from another angle.
In this figure, which is a graph of the years of commissioned
service at the field grade promotion points for the period
through 1970, grade distribution has boen held at the maximum
authorized under the Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954.
The promotion attrition used in this projection is the same
as that used in the previous projection, 20% at promotion from
captain to major and major to lieutenant colonel, and ~5Q% from
lieutenant colonel to colonel. Thus in this projection
promotion flow was allowed to vary as necessary to accommodate
the hump through the grade of colonel. As can be seen from the
figure, promotion flow is retarded beyond the Officer Personnel
Act limits at both the captain to major and major to lieutenant
colonel promotion points. In the case of the major to
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retarded beyond limits in 1963 and continue.", to be retarded
further and further throuph 1969. Retardation also hits the
other two promotion points but not to the drastic extent that
it strikes in the major to lieutenant colonel promotion noint.
Thus this approach to a solution to the humo reaches a major
obstacle in the form of excessive promotion retardation.
In Figure 8, the third variable, that of promotion
attrition, is allowed to vary as reouired during the period
through 1970. In this figure the grade limitations authorized
under the Officer Grade Limitation Act have been maintained.
Promotion flow was held within the maximums allowed under the
Officer Personnel Act. As can be seen from the figure, exceeds
the maximum desired attrition at both the major to lieutenant
colonel and lieutenant colonel to colonel promotion points
throughout the period until 1966. In the case of the lieutenant
colonel to colonel promotion point the attrition would be
excessive throughout the entire time period portrayed. In the
case of the major to lieutenant colonel promotion, drastic
attrition would be required through the 1966 period. At that
time promotion attrition would drop off to a minimum level of
20 percent and it would be necessary to accelerate promotion
flow to maintain a sufficient number of lieutenant colonels.
Thus the variance in the attrition rates that would be applied
to succeeding year groups would destroy the baric policy of
equality of promotion opportunity.
An examination of these three approaches to the hump



















satisfactorily solve the problem. It ent from recent
congressional reactions that increases in the authorized grade
distributions abort that authorized under current legislation
would not be ae< bla« Fhis was particularly true after the
1 Islation was nassed last year giving sizable increase
to the senior grades. Another factor that would lead to t
same conclusion is the stress on economy within tie executive
branch that has become i.ore pronounced with c massing year.
The excessive stagnation and attrition that \ result from
the other two aDproacher to the problem were also highly
unsatisfactory, both frorr the point of view of the rine
Corps and that of the individual concerned.
Under the excessive attrition solution, there would
not only be created difficult morale problems as a result of
the inequality of the solution, but there would at the same
time be crested future problems of insufficiency due to the
small numbers of officers in the valley year groups behind the
hump. Under the retarded promotion flow solution the stagna-
tion that would be reci irso" would be entirely unacceptable to
the Marine Corps, to say nothing of the effect on individuals.
The ag-ing process that woulo result fi is solution would
necessarily have an adverse effect on the operational effective-
ness of the arine Corps, a condition that cannot be tolerate
during these periods of tension that a; to be a normal
part of today's world.
Thus it beeasae obvious that any solution to the hump
which would be satisfactory to the Marine Corps would require
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a procedure which would allow the hump to be processed through
the major to lieutenant colonel promotion t>oint without
excessive attrition, while at the same time not retard!'
promotion flow to an unacceptable degree. The only manner in
which this could be accomplished without an increase in the
authorized grade distribution would be the creation of additional
vacancies in the senior grades. This would also, in effect,
apply retroactive attrition to those year groups which through
a combination of circumstances have had very little attrition.
The procedure that appears most desirable to accomplish this
goal is this: the early retirement of those officers that
have previously been twice passed over, but who as a result of
accelerated promotion would not be scheduled, for involuntary
retirement until many years in the future. Additional vacancies
could thus be achieved not through now attriting additional
officers who had passed selection, but rather by speeding up
the retirement of those who had failed of selection. The
Officer Personnel Act provided for the involuntary retirement
of lieutenant colonels who had twice failed of selection to
colonel at the end of 26 years of commissioned service; also,
for the involuntary retirement of colonels v/ho had twice failed
of selection to brigadier general at the end of 30 years of
commissioned service. These periods of involuntary retirement
re directly related to the maximum promotion points to
colonel and brigadier general listed in the Act. As a result
of the accelerated promotion in those grades in the Marine Corps,
some lieutenant colonels and colonels who have been twice passed
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over have as much as seven years additional service before
they will be subject to involuntary retirement. It is in
this area that the additional vacancies would, be created
through earlier involuntary retirement.
It was determined that these additional vacancies
resulting from the adoption of this procedure would allow for
a solution to the promotional problem of the hump in what was
considered to be an equitable manner. The proposed solution
would meet the requirements of the Marine Corps and would also
allow for equitable treatment of the affected individuals.
The additional vacancies would allow the promotion attrition
from major to lieutenant colonel to be held at not more than 30
percent, and from lieutenant colonel to colonel at not more than
40 percent. At the same time promotion flow could be maintained
within the maximums established in the Officer Personnel Act.
Planning for solution to the hump was therefore continued under
the assumption that the legislative assistance could be obtained
when it was needed.
Conferences with the hump planners in the Navy made it
apparent that common legislation would be possible despite the
fact that the problems in the two services were somewhat
different. Implementing legislation was offered to Congress
during 1958, but only short hearings were held on it and the
bill did not clear the committee. It appears probable that
one reason why the bill did not get much attention in the 1958
session was the fact that the pay legislation was getting the
center of attention and was being justified primarily on a basis
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of retaining qualified officers in the services. The hump
legislation, despite all the justification in the world, would
have had the appearance of belno; in conflict with the basic
objective of the pay bill, i.e., that it would have been aimed
at forcing senior officers out of the service while at the
same time more money was being voted to retain officers in
the service. The feeling that the hump legislation might tend
to Jeopardize the pay bill might have been one reason for the
limited action that took place on it during the 1950 session.
The legislation has been introduced, again this year (1959) in
somewhat modified form and. quick action resulted in the House
of Representatives.
The proposed legislation provides, in brief, that
twice passed over colonels and captains can be involuntarily
retired after they have completed 23 years of commissioned
service. This orovision is in lieu of the 30 year period
provided for under the Officer Personnel Act. Twice passed
over lieutenant colonels will be sub.iect to involuntary
retirement after completion of 20 years of commissioned ser-
vice, in lieu of the 26-year provision that is currently in
effect. These are the two major provisions of the proposed
legislation. There are other related technical provisions of
the legislation. One of these technical provisions is of
importance to the Marine Corps. This provision, the so-callo I
"zone of consideration" policy, will be discussed in detail
in the next chapter as to its need and expected use.
The subcommittee hearings on the bill made clear the
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fact that there war little opposition to the bill itself,
since the congressmen recognized the need for rer.oedi-
islation. The major area of concern was for the officers
Who would be involuntarily retired at an earlier time than
previously anticipated. The committee felt that there was an
obligation to do something for these officers in recognition
of the possible hardships to which they might be subjected.
The question was raised as to v/hether the regular officers
have, in effect, a contract which specifies a certain term of
office and if 30 would the subject bill breach any contract.
In answer to this question the legal opinion came up with the
following conclusions:
(a) The office of a Regular Navy officer is a
creature of the Congress, not the constitution.
(b) The appointment of a naval officer does not
create either contractual or property rights in
the office.
(c) The Congress may alter the tenure of naval
officers even though the appointment is phrased
during good behavior, for life, at the pleasure of
the President, or for a specified number of years.
(f ) The change of tenure of an officer pursuant
to lav; does not violate or breach a contract.
8
Despite the legal opinion, the committee members felt that
there was a strong moral obligation on this matter, and they
amended the proposed legislation to provide readjustment pay
to those officers who were affected. The committee considered
that these officers had reason to believe that if they retained
their health and performed their duties in a satisfactory
o
U. S, Congress, House, Providing Improved Opportunity
for Promotion for Certain Officers in the riaval Service, and
for Other Purposes. House Report kol 71 (\vashington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1959)* p. Xl«
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manner, in all likelihood they would continue until they had
reached their statutory retirement point. However the
proposed legislation changes their retirement point. The
committee therefore provided that officers who are involuntarily
retired at earlier times than they would have been prior to
the new legislation will receive 2 months 1 pay for each year
of active service lost through the legislation. A maximum of
000 may he received by any one individual.
The committee also made considerable inquiry into the
cost aspects of the legislation* Inasmuch as the cost
resulting from the legislation were derived from mere projections
the figures were necessarily speculative. Both retired pay
and active duty pay were involved in the computations, wot
only must the prospective increased cost of early retirement
of colonels and lieutenant colonels on the event of the pass'- I
of the legislation be weighed against the increased costs of
the excessive numbers of majors who would be retired in the
event the legislation fails, but also it is necessary to
consider the relative cost of active duty pay under both of
these contingencies. As a result of the inquiry, the committee
determined that the maximum cost of the proposed legislation,
including the readjustment pay recommended by the committee,
would not exceed |15 million spread over the next 60 years.
The committee also made one other change in the proposed
legislation in connection with those officers who will early
be involuntarily retired. This change provided that the records
of all officers who are retired early under this legislation

39
will be modified to reflect a voluntary retirement. The
purpose of this change was as the committee stated it, "Thus
officers whose retirement If necessary to solve the problems
of the World War II hump will not be stigmatized for the rest
of their lives as failures. "^ This change, together with the
readjustment pay, tends to show the strong feelings that the
committee had with respect to the moral obligation to the
individual who would be adversely affected by the legislation.
There was little question raised as to the need for the legis-
lation but the committee wanted to make sure that it did all
that it could to help the individual officer who would be
affected.
This legislation (H. R. 4413) passed the House without
difficulty and at the time of this writing is awaiting hearings
in the Senate. While it is anticipated that the Senate commit-
tee will go into the proposed legislation in some detail, and
may possibly make some minor changes, it is felt that the major
provisions of the proposal will be enacted into law during
this session of Congress. If this be the case, the Navy and
Marine Corps will have the necessary tools to solve their
respective hump problems in a manner that will be equitable to
the individual, and at the same time provide the two services
with the quantity and quality of officers that are required.
The next chapter will be devoted to the application of the
legislation in the Marine Corps and the outlook for the regular
officer structure in future years.
9 Ibid . . p. 22.

CHAPTER IV
THE OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE
This chapter will attempt to forecast what effects
the proposed legislation will have specifically on the various
year groups in, and in the vicinity of, the hump. It will
also attempt to analyze what the legislation will mean to the
Marine Corps as a whole during the coming years. while the
legislation will provide a solution to the major problems
associated with the hump, it will not solve some of the minor
difficulties that are related to it. These remaining problem
areas will be set forth to acquaint the reader with them in
anticipation of administrative action aimed at solving them or
reducing their scope. These areas include the indoctrination
of promotion boards, problems in the detailing of officers, the
internal aviation ground officer balance within the Marine
Corps, and the problems associated with the period after the
expiration of the hump through the normal passage of time.
These will not be treated In detail, but will merely be set
forth to define probable future problem areas.
as has been stated previously, the new legislation will
allow the Marine Corps to phase the hump through the grades of
lieutenant colonel and colonel without requiring that excessive




severely retarded. One of the provisions which aids in the
maintenance of an acceptable promotion flow is that of the
zones of consideration authorized for use in connection with
the major to lieutenant colonel promotions. This provision
would be effective only through 1964, and would allow promotions
to be made from a wider base of officers. The officers that
were not selected from within the zone of consideration would
not be considered as having been passed over until they were
actually placed in a promotion zone. This would permit the
promotion of the more highly qualified majors, without passing
over other majors whose services are valuable and needed by the
Marine Corps. This change would allow, for example for all
of the remaining majors in year group 43 and all of year group
44 to be placed in the zone of consideration for lieutenant
colonel in the I960 promotion cycle.
Due to the large numbers in these year groups, the same
zone of consideration would probably be maintained for the
following year. From that point on, through the 1964 deadline,
one year group could be added each year to the zone of considera-
tion. In the Fiscal Year 1962 cycle, the remainder of year
group 43 who had not as yet been selected for lieutenant colonel
could be placed in a promotion zone, and if passed over that
year and the following year would be retired as they reached
their 20 years of commissioned service. This procedure, in
addition to allowing the early promotion of outstanding Juniors,
would also avoid the buildup in twice passed over majors which
conceivably could result in a rather difficult detailing problem.
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In addition the mixing of the year groups in this promotion
procedure will tend to reduce the size of one year losses to
the regular structure during future time periods. Without
this provision in the legislation, majors who are only separated
by three years in age and service would be separated by as much
as 8 years in entering the grade of lieutenant colonel.
The use of the new legislation will make for a rapid
change in the regular officer structure of the Marine Corps over
the next several years. The initial implementation of the legis-
lation will provide about 125 vacancies in the grade of colonel
and a small number of vacancies in the grade of lieutenant
colonel. The initial implementation will compact the grade of
colonel from the present 14 year groups down to basically 6 year
groups. There may be small numbers of twice passed ever colonels
retained to provide specific experience or skills to the struc-
ture. From the time of the Initial implementation in fiscal
year I960 until fiscal year 1963 there will be very few addition-
al vacancies created due to the present accelerated promotion
flow. From 1963 until the legislation reaches its terminal date
in 1970, the new procedures will provide all the vacancies that
are necessary to support the hump solution.
Figure 9 is a theoretical projection of the years in
which the various year groups should reach the field grade
promotion points, and the probable attrition which they will
face at these various attrition points. An examination of the
figure shows that promotion flow to lieutenant colonel will
















37 — — — 1960- 62 84$
38 — — « — 1963 84$
39 ~ — *mm* 1964 84$
40 — Ml — — — 1965 84$
41 — — — 1966 84$
42 — 1960- 63 40$ 1967- 69 92$
43 1960-62 30$ 1964- 66 40$ 1970- 71 92$
44 1960-63 30$ 1966- 68 40$ 1972- 73 92$
45 1962-64 30' 1969-70 40$ 1974 92$
46 1963-64 30# 1970-71 40$ 1975 90^
47 1964 30$ 1971 35^ 1976 90^
48 1965 25$ 1972 30$ 1976 90$
49 1965 20$ 1972 30$ 1977 88$
50 1966 20$ 1973 30$ 1977 88$
51 1967 20$ 1973 30$ 1978 88$
52 1968-69 20$ 1974 30$ 1979 83^;
53 1969-70 20$ 1975 30$ 1980 88$
54 1971 20$ 1976 30$ 1981 88$
55 1972 20$ 1977 30$ 1982 88$
56 1973 20$ 1978 30 1983 88$
57 1974 20^ 1979 30$ 1984 88$





being promoted until their 19th year of commissioned service
under the zone of consideration principle. The flow will then
accelerate through the valley year groups to the 16th year of
service in the case of year groups 49, 50, and 51. The
promotion flow is then retarded slightly as the secondary
hump created by the Korean war is phased through, and then
levels out at the 17th year of commissioned service. The
promotion flow from lieutenant colonel to colonel will be
retarded from its present accelerated position of 18 years back
to a maximum of 25 years in the case of year groups 45 and 46.
The flow will then accelerate up to 22 years of commissioned
service and will probably level out at somewhere near that
figure.
A look at the promotional atrition on Figure 9, shows
that at the major to lieutenant colonel promotion point, an
attrition of 30% will be required through 1964. From this
point on the attrition will be gradually reduced down to about
20^ as a level off point. In the lieutenant colonel to
colonel area, the attrition will be h0% through 1970, at
which time the attrition can be lowered quite rapidly to a
figure of about 30". This will provide about the amount of
attrition that would be desirable at this promotion point.
The promotional attrition to general will remain at a level of
about 90$ throughout this time period and may well be the level
of attrition that will be required for the structure on a
permanent basis.
The field grade distribution throughout this time frame
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will remain within the Officer Irade Limitation Act ceilings.
In the grade of colonel we will approach the ceiling in 1962
and will hold close to that celling until 1973. In the
period from 1973 to 1975 the level of colonels will be adjusted
to fit the requirements at that time period and will be
maintained on that basis from that point on. In the grade of
lieutenant colonel the ceiling will be approached in 1962 and
will hold close to that ceiling until 1965. From this point
on lieutenant colonels may be maintained on a requirement
basis with reasonable rates of attrition. In the grade of
major ceilings will not be approached. The number of majors
will reduce somewhat during the early part of this time period
and then commence an increase to a level off strength which
will be reached about 1970.
Figure 10 showc- graphically the change in the profile
of the hump year group during this forecast period. Thus over
a ten year period we are able to solve the hump problem in
terms of pushing the hump year groups through the various
promotion hurdles, without having to exact too excessive
attrition. The greatest effect during this time frame is
through the force-out of twice passed over lieutenant colonels
at the 20 year service point in lieu of the 26 year point.
After the end period of the legislation in 1970, the numbers
of twice passed over lieutenant colonels and colonels in the
structure will commence a build up. It should be mentioned
that this is not an adverse feature to the structure. The
















contribution to the operation of the Marine Corns. They
contribute experience and a certain amount of stability to the
rank structure and help the learning process for the younger
officers in th<~ p 'en. Thus in normal time periods the
rine Corps would undoubtedly be opposed to the early force
out of these category of officers.
There is no question that this legislation is going to
create some personal difficulties in the case of individual
officers. This particularly is true of the group of officers
who will be involuntarily retired in the initial implementation
of the act, as they will have had little time to make prepara-
tions for a ran id introduction to civilian life. A lar-
percentage of these officers are in the most expensive period
of their lifes, with their children still in school. Of
course, as was noted in the hearings | these officers should
have been aware of the fact that there wee to be legis-
lation proposed and. should have been making their plans
accordingly. The readjustment pay that was added into the
legislation as it was passed by the House will, to some extent
aid in the initial readjustment, but there is some doubt that
this feature of the bill will remain in when the bill is acted
on in the Senate.
In addition to the problems of the individuals concerned,
the 'arine Corps will also be faced with several problems that
are directly or Indirectly related to the hump. One of these
problems is in connection with the zone of consideration
principle which will be in use for promotion from major to
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lieutenant colonel. In order for this principle to accomplish
the purposes for which it was designed, it will be necessary
for the promotion boards to be fully aware of the need to
select from throughout the zone of consideration. The principle
of tVte importance of seniority is deeply ingrained in all
Marine Corps officers, and this procedure of having a zone
of consideration requires that the selections be based on taking:
the most highly qualified officers from throughout the zone.
The fact, that there have been no below the zone promotions,
except, in the case of colonel to brigadier general, attests
to the strong feeling of the importance of seniority. It is
honed that the fact officers not selected from the zone of
consideration will be considered not legally passed over, will
help to overcome the feeling of the importance of seniority.
The proper use of the zone of con^i^ . - ration will provide the
Marine Corps with the following advantages:
(a) realignment of certain year groups on the
basis of ability.
(b) promotion attrition will be held at 30'.
(c) holding down the inventory of twice passed
over majors.
The Marine Corns will also face come problems in the
detailing of officers during this time period. There will be
a buildup in the numbers of twice passed over majors and
lieutenant colonels up through 1965, despite the fact that the
use of the new legislation will reduce the numbers of this
category of officer. The detailing problem that will result
from this situation is the problem of getting the younger and
^ore junior officers in the billets necessary for their growth
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without upsetting the seniority patterns that form a part of
our Marine Corps pattern. Thus the detailing of the passed
over officers must be carefully considered at all levels of
officer assignment so as to best use their talents and. exper-
ience without depriving the Junior officers, who will ulti-
mate!! y form the senior grades of the Marine Corps, of the
billets that will give them the requisite knowledge and
background. This is particularly necessary in view of the
relatively rapid turnover in the grade of colonel which will
be in effect during this time period. The officers who are
promoted to colonel must be ready to assume an effective role
ftt the time they are promoted if the Marine Corps is going to
experience this period of rapid turnover in the grade of
colonel without a serious loss in efficiency of operation.
Another detailing problem that will assume larger
proportions during this period is one resulting from the
unequal balance between aviation and ground officers within
the hump year grou . This situation has been the subject of
numerous studies during the past few years and undoubtedly
will be the subject of more during the next few years. Marine
Corps promotion policy and assignment policy have always been
aimed at providing the best qualified Marine officers, regard-
less of occupational speciality, for promotion and assignment
to particular billets. These policies tend to provide the
Marine Corps with well rounded career officers and at the
same time appear to provide the requisite numbers of officers
qualified in particular occupational specialities. An
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examination of the billet requirements of the various grades
shows that, as we move from company grade up through the
various field grades, the percentage of billets requiring a
particular technical or occupational skill decreases in every
rank. Thus a high percentage of the billets in the grades
of lieutenant colonel and colonel can be filled by officers
qualified in grade, irrespective of their Darticular occupa-
tional background. It has been a well-voiced policy in the
past that, excent for those billets requiring a particular
occupational or technical qualification, all billets should be
filled by the best qualified Marine officer available be he
naval aviator, supply duty only, or ground officer. This
policy, as does the promotion policy, recognizes the importance
of having a flexible officer structure capable of great
degrees of interchangeabillty. Thus while this area seems
certain to receive much attention in the future, it seems that
merely applying past policies will best satisfy the needs of
the Sarine Corps while these hum-o year groups are phased
through the structure.
In conclusion, despite the fact that the passage of
legislation will allow for solution to the hump promotional
problems, the Marine Corps will still be faced with a number
of problems during this period. The severity of these problems
are difficult to evaluate at this time due to the fact that
they will result from events still to take place. One factor
that could influence many of these problems is the possible
change in rate of voluntary retirements at the twenty year
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period, as the hump year groups are faced with a fairly
unstable future. Factors such as further reductions in the
authorized officer strength of the Marine Corps, and the change
in requirements resulting from the rapid change in technology
that is with us today, could ease or complicate the various
problems associated with the hump. The various problems must
be continuously analyzed, making changes as necessary to con-
tinue to provide efficient and equitable solution to the
Marine Corps and to the individual officer concerned.
It is hoped that the reader has been able to gain some
insight into the hump problems which will enable him to adjust
his plans to the changing career pattern with which he will
be faced through the next several years, as can be seen, the
hump problem Is really a problem of equity to individuals. Whil^
the hump year groups are still in the Marine Corps, a wealth
of talent will be available for the operation of the Marine
Corps. It is the period subsequent to the departure of the
hump that will test the ultimate efficiency of the hump solution
from the point of view of the Marine Corps. All in all it will
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